His Honor, Gen. Alfredo Lim, Mayor of the Queen City of the Philippines, the noble and venerable City of Manila,;

The Vice-Mayor, the members of the City Council of Manila, and other officers of the City of Administration;

Dr. Bayani Tayabas, President of the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila;

The Chairman and members of the Board of Regents of the Pamantasan; and

The Faculty and students of the Pamantasan, particularly those of its College of Law.

As I assume the office of Dean of the College of Law of the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila, I am humbled as well as honored by your acceptance of myself as your colleague. As a member of the academe, I join you in the common trust of all institutions of higher learning, which (so I am told) is nothing less than the "continuity of civilization."

For an institution such as ours, which, like the University of the Philippines, enjoys public financial support, the compulsion of this trusteeship is more exigent. To be sure, this is a responsibility which is awesome and daunting. But its weight should be lightened by the excitement of its challenge.

It is in the light of this trusteeship (which Justice Holmes put more succinctly as the obligation "to teach law in the grand manner and to make great lawyers") that I propose to share with you this afternoon my thoughts about legal education generally. And, in particular, about the proper role and function of a law school such as ours, which – like my alma matter, the UP College of Law – is a *university law school*, and *takes its status as such as institution seriously.*

I

Any thoughtful assessment of legal education, I submit, must begin with the clarification of its primary task. Or stated differently, of the essential function of *university law school.* This is so for how this task is conceived, or how this essential function is defined, will determine, *firstly*, the ultimate goal of legal education, and, *secondly*, prescribe the standards of excellence by which its success or failure will (or should) be judged.

Goals and standards will, in turn, define the content, delineate the emphasis, and determine the primary thrust of the law instruction program.

Perhaps a good starting point for any examination of legal education is the famous dispute as to the proper function of a university law school. The dispute is frequently represented as involving the dilemma between "liberalism" and "vocationalism," or in more familiar terms, between "theory" and "practice."

While this dispute has yet to be settled conclusively, the weight of enlightened opinion – which begun to take definite shape as early as Blackstone's day – leans heavily on the side of those who maintain that there is no irreconcilable incompatibility between these two goals, that is to say, between "liberalism" and "vocationalism," between "theory" and "practice," or stated more explicitly, between the aims of *superior university education* and the needs of *adequate professional training.*

And the triumph of this point of view is attested to by the fact that most, if not all, law schools today, both here and abroad, are now affiliated with universities.

Indeed, commitment to the pursuit of scholarship for its own sake – which is the "traditional function of universities, and the ancient loyalty of all university men" – is specifically avowed as one of the goals of law schools, at least in the official rhetorics of law school brochures or catalogues. However, this function is ordinarily subordinated to a more basic commitment, namely "the training of lawyers."

This view as to the relative importance of this two-fold educational function of a law school, I believe, commands the assent of even the most ardent exponents of the "*craft*" or primarily "*professional*" conception of legal education.

Perhaps, the most adequate description of the many elements which coalesce to make up this baffling entity called the *modern university law school* is the one which was so lovingly formulated by Professor Edward H. Levi, who was successively Dean of the University of Chicago Law School, and later was the Chancellor of the same institution, and, subsequently Solicitor General of the United States.

Dean Levi's formulation is as follows:

> It is not easy to describe the modern university law school – party prep school, partly graduate school – in part directed toward the intellectual virtues and the attributes of scholarship, and yet in main thrust the producer of technicians for a learned (and sometimes demi-learned) profession containing within itself many of the same conflicts and contradictions. . . The finishing school or prep school attributes are still with us. But the result is not bad. The esprit and spirit of the modern law school are the wonder of many graduate departments and other professional schools. . . We have created a liberal arts graduate program and have given to it a generalist professional thrust to justify an across-the-board attention to precision and structure within a common subject-matter. We have substituted the

> law for the classics. We are for the most part overwhelmingly interested in teaching, which to some extent sets us apart from other graduate areas. We are giving the modern counter-part of a classical education to many who will be the leaders of our country as well as of the Bar. The result is a powerful intellectual community in which a continuous dialogue is not only possible because of the sameness of subject, but is insisted upon both because of the method of instruction and the type of research which is expected and honored.

Dean Levi then concluded the above description by reaffirming the primacy of the law school's function as a professional school, in these words:

> The motor power, of course, is still the thrust for the training in a profession. The Bar still regards the modern law school as the successor, not only in time but also in spirit, to the law office traineeship. The law faculties still worry most directly about the actual problems which graduates may face.

II

If, then, the training of lawyers is rightfully the primary function of a law school – even of a *university law school* – the question which needs to be asked and answered is: "How shall we describe a lawyer?" Especially, "a modern lawyer?"

Looked at form this perspective, it is clear that the key to a meaningful and serviceable legal education program, *i.e.*, one which will be consistent with the postulated goals of a law school, is a comprehensive and an adequate knowledge of the many, varied and changing tasks, functions, roles and responsibilities which are constantly being thrust upon the modern lawyer. In this connection what is important to realize is that today it is no longer "earth-shaking to note that the role of the lawyer in society has changed." Or even to assert that "the practice of law I the coming years will be different from what it is today." Moreover, in devising a program of legal education, it is equally important and sobering to realize that we are "educating students who will be practicing their profession, or guiding business enterprises, or holding high public offices during the first decade of the next century."

The task of clarifying the emerging – or if you will, the changing -- role of the modern lawyer is complicated by other factors. Chief of these is the fact that today we are living in a period of "unexampled change, which is at once so rapid, at times so turbulent, and withal, so pervasive and so manifest that we are hardly aware of it, or tend to take it for granted." As is well-known, "this change has been brought about by the unparalleled explosion of knowledge, which has assumed its most dramatic form in the uncanny and accelerating development of automated machines and mechanized intelligence."

It is now also a truism that "while the direction, scope and significance of this revolution still have to be fully understood, and the new needs and challenges which it has brought in its wake have yet to be determined, it is now an accepted truism that education, at all levels, must learn to cope with this revolution if it is to answer to the challenge of adequacy and pertinence." And, too, if it is to see in this revolution "more of hope and opportunity than of fear."

In the domain of law a similar explosion of knowledge is taking place, which has set off a parallel revolution. Here likewise this revolution has resulted in the growth and proliferation of specialized knowledge, techniques and skills. At the same time other factors are at work and are producing similar effects. Of these one of the most manifest and the most compelling is the growing pressure of the masses, as exemplified by EDSA I, whose power has been "reinforced by an increasing refinement of our sense of social justice."

In other areas extraordinary changes are similarly taking place, although in some instances more subtly and less noticeably, and at times, even surreptitiously, "behind a façade of changeless continuity."

This process of constant change and development is of course a continuous one. Under these circumstances, it should be increasingly apparent that any attempt to provide a program of legal education which will be adequate for the future needs of the members of the profession will unavoidably include "as much of the elements of the crystal ball and of the hunch, as of reasoned foresight and inspired vision." Such that, perhaps, the only rational and realistic approach to the problem of developing a sound, stimulating and serviceable program of legal instruction, in the midst of certain change, is to keep it under constant, close and active scrutiny. In other words, this is a task which will never be finally accomplished. It is and will remain a continuous process of reappraisal, revision, innovation and experimentation.

III

But for all these doubts and difficulties, I think that it is nonetheless possible to define and delineate, in a sufficiently satisfactory way, the necessary equipment for the modern lawyer, which should be suitable to his emerging or the changing roles.

I submit that a sound and serviceable legal education program is one which aims to achieve five specific objectives. These are: (1) to help him acquire requisite knowledge; (2) to help him achieve basic skills; (3) to help him develop sound attitudes; (4) to help him establish essential habits; (5) to help him gain an understanding of professional and ethical principles.

This afternoon, I propose to deal on these objectives only in bold strokes and in general terms.

In a future which will, very likely, be characterized by predictable change and consequent uncertainty, perhaps the best – if not indeed the only conceivably rational – type of professional education is one whose main thrust would be the awakening, the development, the enhancement and the sharpening of the student's capacities and strengths, rather than one which aims mainly to impart some "specific system of substantive knowledge," especially if such knowledge consists largely of up-to-date summaries of the latest legislative enactments or judicial decisions.

Of course, a good grounding in the fundamental principles and techniques of the existing legal systems is always a necessary part of a lawyer's equipment. So too is adequate proficiency and skill in its essential reasoning procedures. But equally important is the development of certain *intellectual skills*, such as:

a. *creative imagination*, or the ability to understand new and unfamiliar situations, to acquire specialized knowledge when relevant, and to use the methods and findings of other disciplines when needed or useful;

b. *creative ingenuity*, or the ability "to break through artificial textbook boundaries," or arbitrary "conceptualistic compartments," and to fashion "novel arrangements and designs for new institutions to suit the hopes and needs of public policy and private transactions," and

c. *a passion for accuracy and precision*, which finds its finest embodiment in the "needle-work mentality of the bondhouse lawyer" upon whose "care and scruple private empires and national treasuries may be safely reposed."

Also, the stimulation of such *attitudes* as:

a. the habit of self- reliance and independence, as well as the ability to make decisions;

b. an abiding attitude of curiosity and inquiry, of continuing self-education, through critical reading and evaluation of information; and

c. "disciplined tough mindedness," or put differently, "a skepticism which insists that inquiry be exhaustive, conclusion not hasty, and inspiration to be distrusted," – an attitude indicative of a mind trained in the "art of the relevant, and convinced of the many sidedness of things."

And underlying these essential *intellectual skills* and *attitudes* must be a reasonable mastery of the *requisites language skills*, as to both its oral and written aspects. The importance of language skills goes beyond the pragmatic truism that words are peculiarly the tools of the lawyer. The greater significance of such mastery is, as both experience and scientific findings now confirm, that *it is one of the most reliable measures of a man's intellectual ability.*

At the same time, an adequate system of professional education must aim at the development of attitudes which are compatible with the obligations and responsibilities of a lawyer as a member of a profession.

Among these are:

a. a special concern for the administration of justice;

b. the acceptance of the "principles implicit in the form of law, namely, that in law's application there must be essential equality, and that in the processes of law making and law deciding there must mutual respect and fairness among the official participants"; and

c. the willingness to "look to reason and civility as the arbiters of disputes, and the resolute negation of coercion as the organizing principle of human destiny" – without which surely the rule of law and liberty are but empty words.

The above enumerations are of course neither exhaustive nor sacrosanct. Any other listing or classification will do. What is important is that any proposed program of legal education should aim consciously to develop such *skills* and *attitudes* and others of like nature.

IV

At this stage, I believe that I have already said more than enough for a day's work. But before I close, I should like to issue a challenge to the constituency of the Pamantasan College of Law, namely, my colleagues in the faculty, and the students who have entrusted themselves to our tutelage.

As I understand it, our College of Law is barely a decade old. For any institution of real worth, that is still the age of infancy, which need not be a cause for *weakness*, but rather a source of *strength* – and of *opportunity* as well.

For unlike my Alma Mater, the UP College of Law (which is now approaching its first centenary), we are not weighed down by a proud and a pridefully advertised tradition of excellence. As you well know, the thought that we are heirs of such a tradition gives us strength which we would not otherwise have, imbues us with confidence (or, as some wags would prefer to put it, with cockiness and even unwarranted self-assurance) – a confidence which, "in moments of crisis, allow us to conduct ourselves with courage, as well as dignity and grace."

But a legacy of excellence or of greatness, also counsels caution, deliberation, restraint, prudence - which not infrequently render us unfree "to surrender to our passions, our desires, our hopes."

Since the College of Law of the Pamantasan is young and is just beginning, its present constituency of faculty, students and alumni are still unburdened by such a tradition (of excellence or of greatness), and untroubled by anxiety about being judged unworthy by their predecessors.

Accordingly, our College of Law is free to experiment, to innovate – to dare to be venturesome, valorous, audacious even.

More, it still has (or should have) the confident faith "to dream the impossible dream," and to "plunge forward toward a future splendidly conceived, however sketchy the detail."

And so today, in hope as well as doubt, I should like to invite the faculty and students body of the College of Law of the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila, to share with me the dream of building upon this site a great School of Law, which may serve for all of us "as a beacon upon the hill," "to steady us when we seem to falter, to strengthen us when we seem to weaken, to reassure us that for all the failings and the backslidings, for all the fears and all the prejudice, the spirit (of the Law and of the profession) is still pure."

This is a task which will *demand the labor, the dedication, the heroism and the sacrifice of many generations.*

But let us lay the first stone.

Thank you all for your infinite patience and unfailing courtesy.