

ence between games and law. The other great difference, of course, is that there is no choice as to participation in the world of law. The conscripted participants in this world affect the purposes of the rules, just as the rules interact on them and change their purposes and personalities in a way no game ordinarily does. The participants' values are inextricably enmeshed not only with the operation of the rules, but with what the rules shall be. The static and abstract model of rules whose end is to perpetuate themselves does not exist in any actual social situation. Hart's model is Monopoly writ large. It is not an analysis of law in a live society.

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GENERALIZATION IN ETHICS: An Essay in the Logic of Ethics, with the Rudiments of a System of Moral Philosophy. By Marcus George Singer. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961. Pp. xvii, 351. \$6.00.

It could be persuasively argued that contemporary thought — at least at its supposedly more sophisticated levels — has been infected by a radical schizophrenia. It has for some time been the dominant fashion in intellectual circles to accept without question or qualm the knowledge function and the truth value of certain approved methods of inquiry, and to dismiss as merely "speculative" or "subjective" or "emotive" or "relative" the claims of any discipline that cannot establish its results by these methods. The accepted models of rationality are those of logico-mathematical deduction and controlled empirical verification. When these criteria are applied with a proper mixture of zeal, bigotry, and naivete, they issue in a sharp bifurcation: mathematics and the "descriptive" or "natural" sciences are held in high repute; while other areas of investigation, and especially such "normative" inquiries as have to do with the questions of morals, esthetics, and politics, are denied intellectual respectability on the ground that they are vitiated by the intrusion of "arbitrary," "personal," and "variable" factors.

The present book is an attempt to rectify this situation insofar as it pertains to moral theory. This is hardly a novel undertaking; many have chafed under these invidious distinctions and have resisted the restrictions that they place upon inquiry. But the majority of such efforts have been largely critical and methodological in their bearing: they have consisted of arguments against this manner of treatment, attacks on the "most favored discipline" doctrine, and forewarnings of the irrationalism that such a bifurcation threatens and almost solicits. But they have not been outstandingly rich or rigorous in their attempts to justify the claims of the "normative" sciences to be rational disciplines. It is the great merit of Mr. Singer's book that it is devoted exactly, and exclusively, to this task: it embodies a conscious commitment to establish the rationality of moral theory, and to this end it eschews all other considerations and paths of inquiry, however inviting they may be.

Because of this special and explicit commitment, the book has, in one sense, an extremely limited scope. It altogether ignores many subjects and problems whose treatment is necessary to a complete system of moral philosophy, and which