Part 1 (Perplexities of Legal Theory): The author opens the chapter by asking the question What is Law?, and how a lot of literature are dedicated in answering such perplexing question, especially when compared to other fields such as Medicine and Chemistry, which he poses do not dwell much on such question. Ordinarily, the question of what law is often is predicated with answers concerning statutes, interpretation by the courts, or even the constitution itself. These are not what law is. Rather, these are mere sources of law, which stipulate its sanctions. This understanding of law is considered as both illuminating and puzzling, as they throw a light which makes us see much in law, but the light is so bright that it blinds us without a clear view of the whole.
The legal system presents itself in similar ways in different countries in spite of important differences. Salient similarities include rules enjoining certain types of behavior, rules requiring compensation for injury, rules stipulating requirements for executing documents (wills, contracts, etc.), courts determining what the rules are, and a legislature making new rules. Despite these similarities, why is the question What is Law?still present itself as something perplexing? There are still doubtful cases where the propriety of the word Law is still denied, such as the case for International law, where the law lacks some standard concepts (legislature, etc.), where the degree of it being Lawveers away from its proprietary understanding, and that certain elements make it “more” or “less” of Law.
In describing the law, why should we not just repeat the skeleton accountof the salient features of a municipal legal system? Because there is deep perplexity with Law beyond that of what is similar, and without doing so, it does little more than remind us the existing conventions governing the use of the word, which is useless. There is then a need to defer answering the question of What is Law?, and find out what is is about law that has in fact puzzled those who have asked or attempted to answer it. What more do they want to know and why do they want to know it? There are central recurring issues that are to be look upon in finding the answer.
Part 2 (Three recurrent issues): Three issues were presented showing how these are essential in the request for a definitionof law or its nature. The first 2 issues talk about howthe existence of law means that certain kinds of human conduct areobligatory, and not optional. First, the simplest sense in which conduct is no longer optional, is when one man is forced to do what another tells him through threat (such as that of a person pointing a gun at you). In law, this is presented as an obligation,where the difference is that this is imposed in a group of people. How then do Law and Legal Obligationdiffer from orders back by threat? Second, Moral Rulesimpose obligations as well and withdraw conduct from the free option of the individual, since it is believed that all municipal legal systems reproduce the substance of certain fundamental moral requirements. This view on law though leaves insufficient room for differences between legal and moral rules (ie. Is an unjust law a law?). Third, many people interpret law as containing or consisting largely of rules, yet confusion concerning this seemingly unproblematic notion underlies much of the perplexity about the nature of law. What are rules? Rules may be mere convergence in behavior between members of a social group [Habitual Behavior] or those imposed legally. Both may result to hostile reactions if deviation is made, but it is in the predictability of the punishment where they diverge, as legal rules are more stringent in this case. The predictive aspect though is irrelevant, whereas its status as a guide and justification is essential. Theorists propose that we merely thinkthat there is something in the rule which binds us to do certain things, but this is just an illusion; a mere powerful “feelings” of compulsion.
Scepticism about the character of legal rules has not, however, always taken the extreme form of condemning the very notion of a binding rule as confused or fictitious. Instead, it invites us to reconsider that a legal system wholly or primarilyconsists of rules, where judges frame their decisions as a necessary consequence of predetermined rules, which may have more than one interpretation depending on the alternative meanings that a judge may do so choose. Not only are the rules uncertain, but the court’s interpretation may be not only authoritative but final.
Part 3 (Definition): Definitionis primarily a matter of drawing lines or distinguishing between one kind of thing and another. It is of most’s predicament that they can identify a thing (e.g. elephant), but cannot define what that thing is. The metaphor of a map is then used to illustrate what definition is in as much as it allows for a route from which one person may understand what a thing is. This “map” may make explicit the latent principle which guides our use of a word, and may exhibit relationships between the type of phenomena to which we apply the word and other phenomena. One form of definition is called per genus et differentiam, which uses form of words that can be substituted for the word defined, particularly focusing on the word’s genus (family). In the context of law, the general family then are the rules of behavior, but we should note that rules in itself is as perplexing as law. For this, something more fundamental is needed, as we cannot rely on the tacit assumption that all instances of what is defined falls directly upon a family. A definition can be done through analogies that are linked by different relationships to a central element, where the several instances may be different constituents of some complex activity.
Throughout the course of the book, it is the author’s goal to show if it is possible to isolate and characterize a central set of elements which form a common part of the answer to all three issues presentend earlier [How does law differ from and how is it related to orders backed by threats? How does legal obligation differ from, and how is it related to, moral obligation? What are rules and to what extent is law an affair of rules?]
Straight from the Hart 