Part 1 (Varieties of Imperatives): The chapter opens with the statement that the next two chapters will be on the criticism of a theory that of Austin’s, which is characterized as a theory which has perennial attractions whatever its defects may be. The imperative moodis roughly discriminated into ‘please,’ ‘plea,’ or ‘warnings.’ A pleaseis one in imperative form but does not suggest either of any great urgency or any hint of what may follow on failure to comply. On the other hand, a pleais characterized as one that would normally be uttered as a requestwhere the speaker is at the mercy of the person being addressed. Lastly, a warning contemplates a situation where the speaker knows of some impending danger to the person addressed.
In the case of a bank robbery, a gunman may ordera clerk to hand over the money; much more so than to actually plead for it. If the robbery is successful, the gunman is then considered as someone who successfully coercedthe clerk to give the money, where the latter obeyed the ordersof the former. This may somehow be misleading, since the word ordernaturally implies an authorityover someone, such as the one when the gunman ordersa henchman to guard the door while the robbery is ongoing. This situation then shows only that of coercive orderswhere the orders are only supported by mere threats, and not one with authority. Moving forward, we do not use the word commandon simple situations where threats of harm and nothing else is used to force obedience; authority is somehow present, such in the case of a commanderto an armed force. This part concludes that Austin was more concerned with the use of orderin the sense of the gunman-clerk relationship, than that of the use of commandin a commander-subordinate one. The relationship with Lawthen, with the presence of authority, lies in the latter description.
Part 2 (Law as Coercive Order): In a society, there is no way for authorities to secure that every member of the society was officially and separately informed of every act which he was required to do. Hence, the standard form of statues is general in two ways, 1) it indicates a general type of conduct, and 2) it applies to a general class of persons.
Legal Control, then, such as penal laws, are not designed to be exclusive to one person. Instead, the control is directed generallyto a class of people, which may vary depending on the legal system and even the different laws. This generality is described to be the first feature which must be added to the situation of the gunman if it is to reproduce the characteristics of law. Two distinct questions then arise, namely “To whom does the law apply?”and “To whom has it been published?” In the situation of the gunmen, the orderof handing over the money is directed to the clerk, and thus when it is addressed, let’s say, in an empty room, it could be said that the order has no effect at all, except for the fact that he uttered it on his own. With respect to making laws and merely just ordering people to do things, the former is complete even though those affected are left to find out for themselves what laws have been made.
The second feature is that of a law having the characteristic of a standing order. In the situation of the gunman, the order to give him money is a one-time thing, and once he leaves, the order no longer any effect. This shows a certain type of superiority or ascendancy, but it only lies in his temporary ability to make a threat. Thus, it can be said that no standing orders have been issued. There must then be a continuing belief that disobedience of the Lawwill result to execution of threats, not just upon its promulgation but also until it has been withdrawn or cancelled. Whatever the basis of this general belief in the likelihood of the execution of threats, we must suppose that most orders are more often obeyed than disobeyed by most of those affected, which Austin calls ‘a general habit of obedience,’ a concededly vague or imprecise notion. This gives the idea that mere temporary ascendancy – such as the case of the gunman – is naturally thought of as the actual polaroppositeof law, with its relatively enduring character.
Lastly, something must be said about the person who gives the orders. The legal system is characterized by a certain kind of supremacy within its territory and independenceof other systems. This means that persons subject to one system is not required to follow that of another, unless he/she subjects himself to the latter. And looking at it the other way around, a personsupremein one location – internally supremeandexternally independent, is not necessarily supreme in another, unless the subordinatesof the latter subjects themselves to the supremacy of this person. If we call such a supreme and independent person the sovereign, the laws of a country will be the general orders backed by threats which are issued wither by the sovereign or subordinates in obedience to the sovereign.
Straight from the Hart 